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Ethics
January 1984 to be implied by the view that exploitation involves an involuntary transfer. Contrast this with our judgment of Red's similarly gluttonous behavior at a Christmas party given by his Scrooge-like employer. This piece of conduct might similarly fail to arouse our admiration, but the terms of our disapprobation would be significantly different from those in the first case.
II
As has been argued, it is not true that an exploitation is accurately characterized as consisting in one voluntary transfer and one transfer which is either less voluntary or involuntary: both are voluntary, and may be equally so. What can be said, however, is that part of one of the two transfers is, in a sense yet to be identified, unnecessary. That is, the convertibility of an exploitation into an exchange implies that, under certain circumstances, Blue would voluntarily transfer 5X for Red's 5X and, by extension, 3X for Red's 3X. Why, then, is Red paying 2X "over the odds" for Blue's 3X? Note that we cannot say that he is doing so either (i) because he prefers to, as this would be a benefit, or (ii) because Blue is taking it from him without his consent, as this would be a theft.
What is it about the circumstances actually prevailing that necessitates Red's transferring this surplus which, in other circumstances, he would not need to transfer to secure Blue's voluntary transfer of 3X? Part of the answer to this question is to be had from attending carefully to what has been claimed so far. If we are saying that there can be circumstances which do not necessitate payment of the 2X, and that actual circumstances do necessitate it, we are committed to saying that actual circumstances are themselves not necessitated-or, at least, not necessitated by the same causes. What brings about the circumstances of exploitation is not what brings about exploitative transfers. The former are necessary but insufficient conditions of such transfers. They operate, so to speak, to create -the mold within which whatever motivates individuals to engage in nonaltruistic bilateral transfers -exchanges and exploitations-issues only in exploitations. In the different mold that would be constituted by a different set of circumstances, that same motivation would issue in exchanges. This motivation noncontingently necessitates Blue and Red reciprocally transferring 3X. In exploitative circumstances, this same motivation necessitates Red transferring a further 2X to Blue. The occurrence of exploitative circumstances is thus due to factors other than this motivation, and its explanans must therefore be different from that offered for the occurrence of nonaltruistic bilateral transfers. What, then, is the appropriate explanation for the occurrence of exploitative circumstances?
We have seen that, whatever this explanation may be, it must not be such as to imply that the causes of nonaltruistic bilateral transfers, in general, would be absent in the absence of exploitative circumstances. For then we could not suppose that exchange would replace exploitation when the latter ceased to occur with the disappearance of exploitative circumstances. And if we could not make this supposition, we should lack the required basis for distinguishing an exploitation from a benefit. On the other hand, our explanation must not be such as to imply that exploitative circumstances are a universally necessary feature of social relations, or we would lose our conceptual entitlement to regard the 2X as unnecessary and surplus.
An explanation of the occurrence of exploitative circumstances will need to include certain generalizations about social relations, such as to imply that some kinds of society contain exploitative circumstances while others do not and that the former are transformable into the latter. What sorts of generalizations can these be? Evidently they cannot be drawn from physics or biology since whatever truths these might register about a society would presumably refer to universally necessary features of it. Could they be psychological generalizations, statements about the motivational factors underlying individuals' behavior? This, too, looks unsatisfactory. For recall that, for exploitation to occur, individuals must be motivated independently-independent of the presence or absence of exploitative circumstances -to engage in nonaltruistic bilateral transfers. If the circumstance which channels that motivation into exploitative transfers is itself held to be the presence of a motivation to engage in voluntary bilateral transfers of unequally valued objects, then that circumstance is not only necessary but (contrary to what has been claimed) also sufficient for the occurrence of such transfers. Hence, the use of this kind of psychological generalization would deprive us of the distinction between a benefit and an exploitation. For, if it were true, it would imply that voluntary bilateral transfers of unequally valued objects would still occur on the same scale, even in the absence of the motivation to engage in nonaltruistic bilateral transfers.
Without canvassing further unsatisfactory candidates for the kind of explanation required to account for the occurrence of exploitative circumstances, I propose simply to suggest that what is involved here is a generalization about social institutions. That is, if (i) certain things are true of the institutions within which interpersonal transfers occur, and (ii) at least some of these transfers are nonaltruistic bilateral ones, then at least some of these transfers are exploitative. What are the institutional conditions of exploitation?
Here we get some assistance from the fact that exploitation is commonly considered unjust. A minimal characterization of injustice is that it involves denying a person what is due to him, something to which he is entitled, something to which he has a right. People have a right not to have their just property transferred from them without their consent. Hence theft is unjust. But an exploited person transfers his property, including his services, voluntarily. How can exploitation be unjust? To understand how this can be so, we must look briefly at the concept of a right and at the ways in which sets of rights are structured to form social institutions.
A right is an inviolable domain of practical choice. What this means is that, with respect to the domain of choice denoted by the object of a right, anything the right holder chooses to do or have done is permissible, and interference by others with the execution of those choices is impermissible. Others are prohibited, are under an obligation to refrain, from interfering with those actions. It is a general truth about all obligationswhether correlative to rights or not-that they are valid only if their fulfillment is possible: ought implies can. Since a right entails a correlative obligation, a right can be valid only if its correlative obligation can be fulfilled. For all the rights in a set of rights to be valid, it is necessary that all the obligations they entail be capable of being conjunctively fulfilled. If the fulfillment of one such obligation renders impossible the fulfillment of another such obligation, at least one of the rights in the set of rights involved must be invalid, and that set of rights must be an impossible set. If A, is an action the doing of which is (i) an obligation correlative to right R, and (ii) a violation of an obligation correlative to R2, then either R1 or R2 is not a valid right. And the set of rights in question is an impossible one inasmuch as it contradictorily implies of A1 that it is both obligatory (and hence permissible) and impermissible.
I have elsewhere argued that this condition for the validity of a set of rights-the condition that they are all compossible-can be satisfied only by a set of rights which are (or are reducible to) titles to objects, rather than entitlements to pursue (or to have others refrain from pursuing) certain specified kinds of intention.' Compossible rights are property rights: they are title based, not action based. It can thence be shown that all exercises of a right by its owner consist either in his modification of the object to which he holds the title, or in his (temporary or permanent) transfer of that title to another person. And all violations of a right consist in interferences by others with such exercises. It follows that all valid rights are so inasmuch as they derive from exercises of (previously) valid rights.2 And, correspondingly, any right is invalid which derives from actions interfering with exercises of valid rights. A thief's title to his gains is invalid, as is that of anyone to whom he transfers those gains, as is that of anyone (including himself) to the proceeds from the sale of those gains or to objects purchased with those proceeds, or to objects exchanged for those objects, and so forth.
These, then, are the structural implications of imposing the compossibility condition on a set of rights. As such, they are sufficient to justify an important part of the "historical entitlement theory" of just rights.3 A set of compossible rights has, as its members, a set of titles which have mutually consistent causal and proprietorial pedigrees. To validate a title, one must show that it was created by the exercise of a Hence a theft is a break in a chain of validation. And so long as it goes unrectified-so long as the stolen object is not restored to its owner or restitution made to him-the chain remains broken, and all titles consequent upon the theft are invalid. The thief's unilateral or bilateral transfer of the object does not give any subsequent acquirer a valid title to it or to the proceeds of its sale.
III
Where does the institutional circumstance of exploitation fit into this account? The property system of a society-the set of legally sanctioned titles and their enforced correlative obligations -constitutes a social institution. Although a title may be invalid inasmuch as it derives from an interference with the exercise of a right (previously) recognized as valid within that system, it may nevertheless enjoy legal protection. The bearing of this on the circumstance of exploitation may be illustrated by a series of examples.
Suppose Blue wishes to trade his 3X for Red's 5X. Suppose, too, that Red wishes to trade his 5X for someone's X, but would nonaltruistically prefer it to be 5X rather than less. Blue cannot escape the charge of violating Red's rights if he simply takes the 5X and leaves his 3X for Red, without the latter's consent. This would be theft. Blue's problem is that White is prepared to offer Red 5X for his 5X. Nevertheless there is a way in which Blue can secure Red's 5X for only 3X, without stealing it. He can do this by forcibly preventing White from offering Red more than 2X for Red's 5X. Have any rights been violated here? No one has actually forcibly taken anything from anyone. Yet an injustice-an exploitation-has occurred. How is it to be explicated in terms of our theory of rights? Is Blue's title a valid one? According to our theory of rights, this depends upon whether that title derives from a rights violation, of which theft is the paradigm form.
Consider what we would deem a theft. My stealing 3X from you is, trivially, a theft. Does it matter what I do with the 3X after I steal it? Is my act less of a theft if I consume the 3X rather than sell it? Clearly not. Is it less of a theft if, after taking it, I destroy the 3X rather than consume or sell it? Again, the answer would seem to be no. What if I destroy it without actually removing it from where you last put it? Although in technical legal usage this offense would be termed a "tort" rather than theft, its difference from the previous case does not appear to be of any considerable pertinence to what is at issue here. In both cases, the salient It is important to notice that, although White is the person who has suffered something relevantly akin to a theft, he is not the victim of the exploitation. Red is. Further, although Red is the person exploited, it is not his rights that have been violated, for he has no entitlement to White's 3X. Red's exploitation results from White's rights being violated. "Results from" because the circumstance of exploitation-a rights violation akin to a theft-though necessary, is not sufficient for exploitation to occur. Red's wish to sell his 5X is also necessary. Nevertheless, because Red's sale of his 5X is not unjust, whereas Blue's violation of White's rights is, and because the latter is necessary for Blue to acquire Red's 5X, we can say that that acquisition is unjust and Blue's title invalid.5 It is a title which derives from an interference with an exercise of a valid right. Perhaps it is the insufficiency of a rights violation, for exploitation to occur, that accounts for the reluctance of some rights theorists to perceive it as an injustice along with theft, for the occurrence of which a rights violation is both necessary and sufficient.
Let us take several increasingly complex, but also more realistic, further examples. Suppose Red wishes to sell his 5X at an auction. And suppose that White is prepared to pay 5X for it, while Blue will offer only 3X. Black forcibly prevents White from offering more than 2X. And the result is that Red sells his 5X to Blue for 3X. Here Black is the rights violator, Blue is the exploiter, and White is the victim of a rights violation. In a third case, Black forcibly prevents both Blue and White from offering 4. An appropriate, if-in the earlier cases-somewhat gruesome, thought experiment which would corroborate this claim, consists in imagining that 3X is one of your limbs. Causing total or partial loss of control could, in this case, consist of causing complete or incomplete paralysis.
5. More precisely, we should say that Blue's acquisition of 2X is unjust, and his title to it invalid, since it is his acquisition of this part of Red's 5X that is due to a rights violation. The implications of this refinement will be discussed presently.
Red more than 3X for his 5X. Regardless of the fact that Blue, who purchases Red's 5X, is someone who has also suffered a rights violation, he is nevertheless an exploiter. His title to the surplus is the result of an interference with the exercise of valid rights, others' as well as his own. A fourth and final variation will serve to complete this list of examples, though more are conceivable as are combinations of these. Suppose that Black imposes no exploitative maximum price on Red's 5X. Instead, he enforces a minimum price on the property of others such that anyone selling 3X to Red must receive 5X from him. This transaction, too, is exploitative. And like the others, it arises from Black's violation of the rights of persons other than Red. In this instance, Black forcibly restricts their use of 2X to which they have valid titles.
All these schematized forms of exploitation may be taken to illustrate two points. The first is that, although the mode of deprivation involved in exploitation is not the same as that involved in a violation of rights, it results from such violations and, moreover, the two deprivations may be of the same value. Second, whereas rights violation-paradigmatically, theft-is a bilateral relation, an exploitation is essentially a trilateral one. At least three persons, or sets of persons, are needed for an exploitation. Consider what is generally regarded as the archetypal form of exploitationslavery. It might be thought that slavery is a clear case of a bilateral relation in which the master simply forces the slave to transfer something which is of greater value than the latter receives in return. But, except in untypical cases where the master renders the slave's noncooperation literally impossible, this is untrue.6
A more perspicuous understanding of the slavery relation is one which construes it, like any other property relation, as trilateral: a relation between master, slave, and all other persons. It is the master's forcible exclusion of all other persons from engaging in commerce with the slave that creates the circumstance of the slave's exploitation by the master. To this it might be objected that, if the slave is the master's property, the latter has a right to exclude others and is not violating their rights in doing so forcibly. The reply to this objection is that it implicitly equivocates over the status of the master's title to the slave. For although it may enjoy legal protection, we can still ask whether it is valid or invalid. And if it is invalid, the master is violating the rights of others whom he forcibly excludes from commerce with the slave. To be valid, as we have seen, the title must have been created by the exercise of a (previously) valid right. In the present case, there are three possible alternative rights which could serve as the antecedent of the master's title: (1) the title of the slave to himself before he sold or donated himself to the master; (2) the right of the master to appropriate unowned objects, including human Nevertheless, some roughly determinate identification of role occupants seems to be possible, not least because there is usually no difficulty in identifying Black whose activities are a matter of public record. Empirically, it seems likely that the greatest identification problems arise less in discovering who Red is-who roughly constitute the exploited in any society-and more in distinguishing the Blues from the Whites. Drawing lines between aristocracy and gentry, landed interests and commercial interests, financial and industrial capital, and so forth can sometimes Ethics January 1984 be less than informative about circumstances in which the actual persons owning one of these types of property also own property of the other type and can employ both in the transactions they undertake. These remarks bring us to a further issue suggested by our earlier discussion. An exploitative transfer, it was argued, gives rise to an invalid title inasmuch as it occurs by virtue of a rights violation. Blue's title to Red's 5X-or, more precisely, to the surplus 2X portion of Red's 5X-is unjust in the sense previously indicated. The question we have now to answer is whether a subsequent bilateral transfer between Red and Blue, of 2X for 2X, is itself exploitative or unjust? This question is important because its answer will tell us whether Red has any grounds for just complaint in a society where Black, having seen the error of his ways, has ceased to intervene in interpersonal commerce. It seems clear that a trade of 2X for 2X cannot be termed exploitative. But it is equally clear that, since a thief cannot be said to have a valid title to his gains nor to the proceeds of his sale of them, neither can Blue's title to the purchased 2X be accounted valid.
Liberals, having rightly judged many types of precapitalist society to be unjust due to their exploitative arrangements, have often given scant attention to the active legacy of those arrangements in the commerce of a laissez-faire order. Blue's accretions of property from his past exploitations-along with Red's corresponding depletions-constitute a perpetuation of the injustices from which they originated and tend less to excite liberal indignation than do persisting interventions. A plausible, if somewhat unsatisfying, reply would be that liberalism cannot be expected to furnish a theory of how to undo the compounded effects of previous illiberal regimes: the unjust legacy of past exploitations cannot be rectified, but noninterventionist liberal institutions can at least ensure that it is not augmented.
What is interesting about this latter claim is that both parts of it have been denied by some liberal theorists themselves. Such natural rights thinkers as Henry George and the early Herbert Spencer reject the standard liberal view that a regime of laissez-faire is a necessary and sufficient condition for the absence of exploitation. To understand the reasoning behind this rejection, we must refer back to our discussion of the structural implications of rights compossibility.
As was there suggested, the validity of a right or title depends upon its being derived from the exercise of a previously valid right. Such exercises were said to be of essentially two kinds: they are either transfers of the title by its previous owner to its subsequent one, or they are modifications by the owner of the object he owns. This implies that all currently valid titles are consequents of a series of antecedently valid titles. And it further implies that all currently valid titles presuppose a set of ultimately antecedent valid titles: the historically original terminal links in all chains of validation. Since all titles which are not ultimately antecedent are ones to objects incorporating (owned) labor-through appropriation and manufacture-ultimately antecedent titles can only be ones to natural resources. Transfers or modifications of natural objects enjoy logical and historical priority as exercises of valid property rights. To whom could these rights belong?
According to Spencer and George, they belong to everyone. A number of different arguments can be brought for this contention, but I shall here present only one.8 It was previously remarked that a necessary condition for all the rights in a set of rights to be valid is that all those rights are compossible. For rights to be compossible, the correlative obligations they entail must themselves be compossible, that is, conjunctively fulfillable. A property right is a right in rem: it is a right entailing correlative obligations in all persons who are not the owners of that right to refrain from using ( The foregoing arguments were brought to consider whether exploitation could occur if the universal right to land (along with the rights derived from its exercise) had been respected from the beginning of historical time. But it hasn't. Spencer and George were acutely aware of this historical fact. What therefore remains to be considered is whether their proposed remedies-laissez-faire plus, respectively, land nationalization or rent nationalization-are sufficient to abolish exploitation. The Wilt Chamberlain case suggests that no members of a set of voluntary transactions can be exploitative if that set derives from a just distribution of initial property rights. Chamberlain's fees for his service are not exploitative. And if there is similarly no forcible intervention in transactions for all other goods and services, there is no reason to suppose that the wages paid by Chamberlain, to those who work in the factory he purchases with his fees, could be exploitative. Nationalization either of the rent extracted from the use of natural resources, or of those resource themselves, were conceived by George and Spencer to constitute a just distribution of initial property rights.
There are problems besetting both the Georgist and the Spencerian proposals, and these problems have implications for political institutions. The relative merit of George's proposal, as he saw it, is that public taxation and administration of land rent would require a far less extensive state than would be needed to administer nationalized land. Spencer, on the other hand, envisaged a system whereby the state would lease natural resources to individuals and groups on the basis of competitive bidding for tenancies. The chief difficulty with both proposals lies in their underdeveloped conception of the kind of political institutions required to implement them.
Recall that the object of such exercises is to furnish each person with an initial share of natural resources. But persons do not, so to speak, all arrive on the scene at the same moment. As with afternoon cocktail parties, they arrive in successive and overlapping and indefinitely numerous generations. And the inconvenience of this state of affairs implies that providing each new arrival with a share in the rent or allocation of natural resources requires a public decision-making procedure of some intricacy. For what counts as the rent of a natural resource, or as the highest bid for its tenancy, is a function of the prevailing set of prices. And these are themselves functions of the prevailing property distribution (as well as of people's preference schedules): that is, the distribution of property already prevailing at the time of a new person's arrival on the scene. Since his just entitlement is supposed to be parametric for the prevailing distribution, rather than determined by it, some institutional arrangements are required to reflect his preferences with respect to what belongs to the public of which he has, after all, become a member.
It would be out of place here, nor do I feel sufficiently competent, to embark on a detailed discussion of what these arrangements could be.'2 I would, however, venture to guess that they rule out the Georgist proposal as inadequate to the task. Spencerian land nationalization looks to be a more promising basis for the abolition of exploitation. Interestingly, Spencer's views on land ownership were chiefly influenced by Thomas Hodgskin, of whom it was said that his "illustrious disciple [was] Karl Marx."'3 One could therefore do worse than to conclude this essay with a pair of quotations from Marx:
To this extent the monopoly of landed property is a historical premise, and continues to remain the basis of the capitalist mode of production, just as in all previous modes of production which are based on the exploitation of the masses in one form or another.'4
The future will decide that the land cannot be owned but nationally. To give up the soil to the hands of associated rural labourers, would be to surrender all society to one exclusive class of producers. The nationalization of the land will work a complete change in the relations between labour and capital and finally do away altogether with capitalist production, whether industrial or rural. Only then the class distinctions and privileges will disappear together with the economical basis from which they originate and society will be transformed into an association of "producers." To live upon other people's labour will become a thing of the past.'5
